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Abstract
Using Packet Timing Information in
Website Fingerprinting
Mohammad Saidur Rahman
Rochester Institute of Technology
Supervisor: Dr. Matthew Wright
Website Fingerprinting (WF) enables an eavesdropper to discover what sites
the user is visiting despite the use of a VPN or even the Tor anonymity sys-
tem. Recent WF attacks on Tor have reached high enough accuracy (up to
98%) to prompt Tor to consider adopting defenses based on packet padding.
Defenses such as Walkie-Talkie mainly remove features related to bursts of
traffic without affecting packet timing. This was reasonable given that previ-
ous research on WF attacks ignored or deemphasized the use of packet timing
information. In this thesis, we examine the extent to which packet timing can
be used to facilitate WF attacks. In our experiment, we gained up to 61% ac-
curacy on our unprotected dataset, 54% on our WTF-PAD dataset, and 43%
on our Walkie-Talkie dataset using only timing-based features in an SVM clas-
sifier. Using a convolutional neural network (CNN), we got 88% accuracy on
our unprotected dataset, and 76% and 47% accuracy on our WTF-PAD and
Walkie-Talkie dataset respectively. We intend to investigate further to develop
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We share a lot of our personal information either willingly or unwillingly on
the Internet. Since the United States Congress has upheld the rights to ISP
providers to sell our browsing history [8], concern for the privacy of this per-
sonal information is increasing day by day. Unfortunately, using a VPN or
other basic protections cannot effectively help Internet users to protect their
privacy [7]. For example,
Using an anonymity system such as Tor is a more effective solution to keep
users’ online activities anonymous while browsing the Internet. Tor is one of
the most popular privacy-enhancing technologies, with more than two million
users each day. Tor is, however, vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks. Traf-
fic analysis enables an attacker analyze the network traffic stream to deduce
information about the client’s activities and communication. Website finger-
printing (WF) is one such attack, and it has received significant attention by
both researchers [9, 19] and Tor developers [18].
In a WF attack, a passive local eavesdropper collects network traffic passing
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between the client and entry node. From the collected traffic, the attacker
then extracts various features and feeds them into a machine learning classifier
trained to identify which website the client is visiting. Prior work has shown
that this kind of attack is very effective, reaching over 90% accuracy [9, 15,
23, 19, 21].
The Tor Project has given much attention to building defenses against WF
attacks [17]. The state-of-the-art attacks emphasize bursts, sequences of pack-
ets in a single direction. Because of this, defenses primarily seek to obscure
burst patterns. This still leaves the timing of packets as a largely untapped
and unprotected resource for features for WF attacks.
Prior work on WF attacks discounted timing information [9]. This is because
timing characteristics change on each visit to the site, which makes it hard to
extract consistent patterns. In this thesis, we investigate a novel WF attack
using packet timing information. Since individual packet times are generally
unreliable as features, we identify more robust timing-related features from
the data. We create new representations of timing information that capture
meaningful features in a reliable way.
We show the effectiveness of our features using traditional machine learning
and deep learning algorithms. Using our new timing features with k-nearest
neighbor (k-NN) and support vector machine (SVM) classifiers, we get 51%
and 61% attack accuracy, respectively. Using the CNN deep-learning clas-
sifier, we get 88% accuracy. These preliminary results indicate that timing
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information is useful for WF attack, and it is possible to develop an effective
WF attack using timing information. Additionally, our timing features show
higher accuracy than that of using packet direction features against Walkie-
Talkie (W-T) defense as well.
1.1 Research Agenda
From our literature review, we find some limitations in the prior work on
WF. Prior work on attacks deemphasized or ignored the value of packet tim-
ing information. This is because timing information varies from instance to
instance, which makes it hard to find any consistent pattern to develop an
attack. In this thesis, we have used packet timing information for WF at-
tack development. As we cannot use raw timing information because of the
larger variability between instances, we need to find a new representation of
the timing information that we can feed into the machine learning classifier.
The research questions (RQ) we investigated in this research are as follows:
RQ1: How can we represent packet timing information in a way that robustly
reveals patterns over different instances of a site?
RQ2: How useful are those new representations for developing WF attack?
RQ3: Do the new representations also provide classification value when WF
defenses are in place?
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1.2 Thesis Organization
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides background of Tor, web-
site fingerprinting, machine learning, and deep learning. Chapter 3 presents
related work of both website fingerprinting attacks and defenses. The moti-
vation for using packet timing information, the way we select timing features,
and the feature extraction process are discussed in Chapter 4. We explain our
evaluation of the experiments and the results in Chapter 5. We then conclude




In this chapter, first we briefly describe the Tor network in Section 2.1. We
provide background on the website fingerprinting (WF) attack model in Sec-
tion 2.2. In Section 2.3 and Section 2.4, we provide background on machine
learning and deep learning respectively, as they are used in WF attacks.
2.1 Tor Network
Figure 2.1: Tor Network.
Tor keeps the user activities anonymous to ensure privacy of the Tor client.
At the time of browsing the Internet on Tor, the user can protect her privacy
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by separating her online activities from her identity. Tor is one of the most
popular low-latency anonymity systems with more than two million users each
day. Tor ensures the anonymity of the users’ activities with the help of three
nodes that constitute a Tor circuit: entry or guard node, middle node, and
exit (see Figure 2.1). For example, the network traffic from the Tor client first
goes to the guard node, then guard node passes those traffic to the middle
node, then middle node to the exit node, and finally exit node to the web
server. Each node is only aware of the previous and next node in the circuit.
For example, the guard only knows about the identity of the client and the
middle, while the exit only knows about middle and the destination of the
client.
2.2 WF Attack Model
Figure 2.2: Website Fingerprinting Attack.
WF attack enables a local passive eavesdropper to identify the destination of a
Tor client’s connection by analyzing the network traffic passing from the client
to the guard (see Figure 2.2). The term local means that the attacker is sitting
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locally between the client and the guard node, and thus he knows the identity
of the client. For example, the client and the attacker are in same wireless
network, and the attacker has the capacity to sniff the wireless traffic. The
term passive means that the attacker does not modify, insert, or delete any
packets’, rather, she just observes the traffic. In this threat model, we assume
that an attacker has the capacity to monitor the traffic between a client and
guard node, and/or she controls the guard node.
Figure 2.3: A Visualization of Bursts − five outgoing bursts interspersed with
five incoming bursts.
A WF attacker can collect traffic traces from several websites of her interest
such as cnn.com, twitter.com, and so on. These websites are called moni-
tored websites. She can extract statistical data as features from the collected
network traffic, such as the total number of incoming packets, the total num-
ber of outgoing packets, the timing of each packet, and so on. A particularly
important class of features is related to bursts sequences of consecutive in-
coming and outgoing packets (see Figure 2.3). She can use the features to
train a machine learning classifier such as k-nearest neighbors (k-NN) and
7
support vector machines (SVM). Using the trained classifier, she can identify
the client’s destination websites.
2.3 Machine Learning
In our experiments, we employ two widely used machine learning (ML) tech-
niques: k-nearest neighbors (k-NN) and support vector machines (SVM). In
the following sections, we provide brief explanation of this two techniques.
2.3.1 k-Nearest Neighbor (k-NN)
The k-NN algorithm can be used for both classification and regression. In
website fingerprinting (WF), we use k-NN as a classifier. As k-NN is a super-
vised ML algorithm, we feed the data along with the associated label to train
the classifier. In our case, the instances of the websites are the data, and the
name of the websites are the labels.
We train the k-NN classifier with training examples (x, y) where x is the feature
and y is the target label or class. The objective is to learn the function
g : X → Y to find the relationship between x and y so that g(x) can predict
the correct label of an unseen x. For every data points, the algorithm measures
a similarity index between the k nearest neighbors and the data point x. A
popular similarity matrix among researchers is Euclidean distance.
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2.3.2 Support Vector Machines (SVM)
Support vector machines (SVM) is one of the popular traditional machine
learning techniques for solving classification problems. The basic idea is to
plot the data points (features) in a n-dimensional space, where n is the number
of features. weight or value of each feature is the coordinate value in the space.
The Classification is done by separating the features by finding hyper-planes
that divide data points in each class [26].
We want our features to be as farther as possible from the hyper-planes. Hyper-
planes can easily be useful to classify the linear features. Classification becomes
challenging when the data points are non-linear. For example, network traffic
data used in WF attacks have non-linear features. To address this, we apply
a technique called kernel trick. The kernel trick transforms low-dimensional
data into high-dimensional data. In the higher dimension, the data points
become linearly separable [14].
2.4 Deep Learning
Deep learning is a type of machine learning that uses neural network method
to train the model to classify more accurately than the traditional machine
learning algorithm such as k-NN and SVM. There are different models of
deep learning such as stacked denoising autoencoder (SDAE), long short-term
memory (LSTM), and convolutional neural network (CNN), and so on. In our
experiment, we mainly use convolutional neural network (CNN) as it shows
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better performance than SDAE and LSTM [3, 19, 21]. Hence, we are going to
give a brief explanation of CNN.
2.4.1 Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)
Figure 2.4: Architecture of CNN.
The convolutional neural network (ConvNet or CNN) has been proven to be
a very powerful deep learning model in the area of computer vision to classify
images. There are four major operations of a CNN model. We can see a
visualization of a CNN architecture 1 from Figure 2.4.
• Convolution
• Activation Function
• Sub-sampling or pooling
• Classification or fully connected
1Adapted from Saleh and Ausif [4].
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Convolution Layer
Figure 2.5: Operation of the convolution layer.
We feed our data points or raw features into a matrix. We map features from
the original feature matrix by convolution. For example, as shown in Figure 2.5
the original input matrix is 5x5, we convolute by 3x3 matrix 2. This 3x3 matrix
is called the filter of the convolution. The convolution is performed by moving
the 3x3 matrix by 1 pixel over the 5x5 matrix and taking the multiplication
value of the 3x3 matrix. Moving by 1 pixel is called stride 1. If we move by 2
pixel, then the stride would be 2. We get the convolved features by scanning
the whole image by this 3x3 matrix.
Activation Function
Activation function is used to introduce non-linear property in a neural net-
work. This function converts the input values to the output values. For exam-
ple, before getting the final convolved features in a CNN, we apply activation
function to introduce non-linearity into the convolved features. It is a very im-
portant part of a CNN as a non-linear operation in a otherwise linear system.
2Adapted from [2]
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The activation function should be selected based on the type of dataset− an
activation function that works for image classification may not be suitable for
WF attacks.
There are several widely used activation functions such as sigmoid, rectified
linear unit (ReLU), exponential linear unit (ELU), and hyperbolic tangent
(tanh). In our CNN models, we use the ReLU, ELU, and tanh activation
functions.
Sub-sampling or Pooling Layer
In this layer, we sub-sample or down-sample the convolved features. This
layer reduces the dimensions of each mapped feature. But it keeps the most
important features. There are some variations of pooling: max, average, sum,
and so on. In our model, we use max pooling. We do that by taking the
maximum of the convolved feature.
Fully Connected Layer
The classification of a CNN is done by the fully connected (FC) layer. Every
neuron is connected to each other in the fully connected layer. The convolu-
tional and pooling layers give us high-level features. FC layer does the actual
classification by softmax regression. Softmax is a regression model for multi-




Tor is the most popular anonymity systems to protect user privacy online.
However, an attacker can deanonymize the activity of a Tor client by the
website fingerprinting (WF) attack. Indeed, to combat this attack, Tor has
deployed WF defenses [17], though these are not considered effective.
In prior works, WF attacks and defenses are investigated in two settings: close-
world (CW) and open-world (OW) [5, 6, 9, 10, 23, 24]. The assumption of the
close world is that the Tor client is visiting one or more websites from a small
set of websites. Only in OW setting, the attacker trains his classifier with only
these websites. On the other hand, in an OW setting, the client is assumed to
visit any website including the monitored websites. But it is not realistically
possible for an attacker to train his classifier with all the possible websites.
So, the attacker trains the classifier with a set of sites only the monitored
website. The state-of-the-art WF attack reaches up to 98% accuracy in the
closed-world setting, and it achieves 95.7% true positive rate (TPR) with 0.7%
of false positive rate (FPR) in the open-world setting.
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In this chapter, we discuss WF attacks using traditional machine learning and
using deep learning in more detail in Section 3.1 and Section 3.2, respectively.
We discuss WF defenses in Section 3.3.
3.1 WF Attack using Traditional Machine Learning
In 2009, Herrmann et al. [10] published a WF attack using IP packet size
for their classifier, but it does not work on Tor, which has fixed-sized packets.
Panchenko et al. designed a new attack adding more features: packet volume,
packet direction, and timing [16]. They used support vector machines (SVM)
for classification and achieved 55% accuracy. In 2012, SVM was again used by
Cai et al. who proposed a new attack based on a new representation of the
classification instances [5]. Their SVM was based on the Damerau-Levenshtein
edit distance and using SVM kernel trick to pre-compute distances between the
traces. This same attack was improved by Wang and Goldberg [24] achieving
91% accuracy. In the rest of the section, we are going to give a brief overview
of three more effective and efficient WF attacks.
3.1.1 WF Attack using k−NN
In 2014, Wang et al. proposed a new attack using a k-nearest neighbor (k-NN)
classifier on a large feature set with weight adjustment [23]. They modified
the typical k-NN classifier with a weighted distance function. In the general
k-NN, Euclidean distance is usually used. There are two phases of the attack:
the weight-learning phase and the classification phase. The weights that are
14
learned in the first phase are used for classification in the second phase. This
attack was the first to use a diverse set of features (bursts, packet ordering,
concentration of the packets, number of incoming and outgoing packets, and
so on) from the traffic information in a WF attack. In a closed-world setting
of 100 websites, they achieved over 90% accuracy.
3.1.2 WF Attack using RDF
Hayes et al. use a novel feature extraction and selection method: they use
random decision forests (RDF) to rank features [9]. The classification is per-
formed by the K-NN classifier using the ranked features of the RDF. This
attack also achieved over 90% accuracy in close-world scenario.
3.1.3 WF Attack using CUMUL
In 2016, Panchenko et al. proposed a new attack improving features based on
packet size, packet ordering, and packet direction [15]. Their attack uses SVM
to classify the websites. Their significant contribution is their new feature set.
In addition, they collected a new data set that is more realistic. Most work
collected the traffic of the 100 most popular websites listed by Alexa known as
the Alexa Top 100 [1]. Panchenko et al. collected their data based on trends
in Twitter, Google, and random Google search results of web pages. They also
collected data from websites censored in China.They were able to achieve 92%
accuracy in close-world scenario.
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3.2 Deep Learning in WF Attack
3.2.1 WF Attack by SDAE
Abe and Goto is the first to explore the effectiveness of deep learning (DL)
effectiveness in traffic analysis [3]. They used a Stacked Denoising Autoen-
coder (SDAE) model as their deep learning model, with a simple input data
representation based on incoming and outgoing packet traces. They got 88%
accuracy using deep learning without any manual selection of packet features.
They used small datasets, which is a reason for their lower attack accuracy.
However, they only considered one type of data representation that completely
omit timing of the packets.
3.2.2 Automated WF
Rimmer et al. [19] investigated automated feature engineering in WF at-
tacks. They studied three deep learning models: Stacked Denoising Autoen-
coder (SDAE), Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), and Long-Short Term
Memory (LSTM). They also collected large datasets suitable for deep learning
models, with 900 websites and 2500 traces for each site. They achieved 96%
accuracy in a closed-world setting.
3.2.3 Deep Fingerprinting Attack
Sirinam et al. [21] extensively investigated the use of deep learning in website
fingerprinting. Their attack could outperform all the previous attack accu-
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racy reaching over 98% attack accuracy. They evaluated their deep learning
model by 100 classes containing 1000 traces each. They developed a power-
ful convolutional neural network (CNN) model for their attack. Their attack
achieved up to 90% accuracy against WTF-PAD, one of the state-of-the-art
defenses. They showed the effectiveness of their attack even though the defense
is in place. Their attack also achieved 49.7% accuracy against Walkie-Talkie
defense.
3.3 WF Defenses
WF defenses aim to reduce the effectiveness of these attacks. For defenses
against WF attacks, we are interested in the state-of-the-art defenses that are
claimed to be highly efficient and have low overheads in latency and bandwidth
for users. Tor implemented a HTTP pipeline based defense [17] to combat WF
attacks. The purpose of this defense is to change the order of the requests when
the number of requests exceeds the depth of the pipeline. This objective is
achieved by randomizing the maximum number of requests in a pipeline. The
bandwidth overhead of this defense is zero. Recently, Tor has updated this
defense mechanism [18] because of the emergence of newly developed attacks.
However, neither version of Tor’s defenses could reduce the attack accuracy of
newly developed attacks [3, 5, 19, 21, 23, 24].
In the next section, we are going to discuss more about the two state-of-the-art
defenses, WTF-PAD [13] and Walkie-Talkie [25].
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3.3.1 WTF-PAD
Website Traffic Fingerprinting Protection with Adaptive Defense (WTF-PAD)
[13] applies the adaptive padding technique to WF defense in Tor [20]. Adap-
tive padding works by sending data packets with padding of a certain distri-
bution and with no delay. By doing so, adaptive padding does not incur any
latency overhead. However, it does incur 54% bandwidth overhead.
3.3.2 Walkie-Talkie
Wang and Goldberg [25] developed Walkie-Talkie (W-T) defense. Their de-
fense is based on the concept of half-duplex communication and burst molding.
The default communication mechanism of Tor is full duplex. In full duplex
communication mode, we simultaneously send outgoing packets and receive
incoming packets. W-T defense requires the communication of Tor browser
to be half-duplex. In half-duplex communication, we send request of packets
and wait to receive all the requested packets, after receiving all the packets,
we send another request of packets. The client and the guard have to use
half-duplex communication mode to implement this defense. This half duplex
mode forms a sequence of outgoing and incoming bursts. The client molds the
bursts of the traces of sensitive website and non-sensitive websites together.
The idea is to make two websites look exactly the same to the attacker. Their
defense has 31% bandwidth overhead and 34% latency overhead.
18
Chapter 4
Packet Timing in Website Fin-
gerprinting
In this chapter, we discuss the motivation for using packet timing informa-
tion, the way we select timing features, and the feature extraction process.
we discuss data collection process in Section 4.1.1 and our datasets in Sec-
tion 4.1.2. We discuss our experimental design in Section 4.2. The process
of feature selection and extraction is discussed in Section 4.2.1. We discuss
hyperparameters tuning of our CNN models in Section 4.2.2.
4.1 Data Collection
4.1.1 Data Collection Process
As we have used the datasets provided by [21], we are going to provide a brief
overview of the data collection process that Sirinam et al. used. Firstly, the
top Alexa 100 websites are selected as the monitored sites. Homepage of each
site is visited 1,250 times and the generated traffic of each visit is dumped in
terms of each visit using tcpdump. We call each visit of a site as an instance
19
of that site.
The data collection is done based on the batch method provided by Wang
and Goldberg. The batch method is useful for managing long and short term
time variance. A batch contains 25 visits of a site at a time. After that, the
crawler visits another site 25 times and this process continues. Batching helps
to collect the traffic over time that helps to avoid the IP to be banned. In
addition, it helps to capture traffic with variation.
The websites are visited using tor-browser-crawler [12]. This crawler is
more realistic in the sense that it helps to emulate the real behavior of a Tor
client. Hence, this crawler is more realistic to collect Tor traffic than the
traditional crawling tools such as wget or curl for our purpose as it has the
necessary settings for that.
At the end of crawling, the sanity check of the datasets is performed. At
first, the instances that do not have more than 50 packets and that do not
contain any incoming and outgoing packets are discarded because they do not
contain enough information for WF attack. After this, 95 valid sites and 1000
instances of each site are selected as the monitored undefended datasets. For
the WTF-PAD defense, the defense is applied to the datasets in simulator to
make defended monitored datasets.
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4.1.2 Datasets
We use three datasets in our experiments, as shown in Table-4.1. These
datasets have been used for the previous work [21, 25] in WF research. We
use both defended and undefended Tor traffic. Defended Tor traffic means
that a defense mechanism such as WTF-PAD or Walkie-Talkie (W-T) is ap-
plied to those traffic. Undefended Tor traffic means the traffic with the default
settings of Tor. For undefended Tor traffic and Tor traffic defended with WTF-
PAD [13], we use the dataset generated by Sirinam et at. [21]. The Walkie-
Talkie defense requires changes to the underlying browser. At the time we
performed our experiments, the dataset from Sirinam et al. did not include




Dataset Source Classes each class Total
Undefended Sirinam et al. 95 1000 95,000
WTF-PAD Sirinam et al. 95 1000 95,000
Walkie-Talkie Wang et al. 100 100 10,000
4.2 Experimental Design
In this section, we explain our process of selecting and extracting timing fea-
tures as well as the process of tuning hyper-parameters for our CNN mod-
els. We have used the K-NN model of Wang et al. [23] and SVM model of
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Panchenko et al. [15] to best compare our results. Using non-timing based
features, they achieve over 90% accuracy. Our intuition was to compare the
results using only packet timing information.
4.2.1 Feature Selection and Extraction
We developed several timing-based features that would be more robust from
instance to instance of each website than relying on specific packet timings.
Since prior work on attacks relies heavily on bursts, we base our timing features
on burst-level characteristics. Three of our features are focused on the timing
of packets inside a single burst.
Median Packet Time (MED):
Figure 4.1: Median Packet Time (MED).
We can see the extraction process of median packet time within a burst from
Figure 4.1. For example, we take the time sequence of the first burst: [0.0,
0.10, 0.20], and take the median of these three values.
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Variance of the Packet Times:
Figure 4.2: Variance of the Packet Times.
We can see the extraction process of variance packet time within a burst from
Figure 4.2. For example, we take the time sequence of the first burst: [0.0,
0.10, 0.20], and take the variance of these three values.
Time from the First Packet to the Last Packet (Interval):
Figure 4.3: Time from the First Packet to the Last Packet (Interval).
We can see the extraction process of interval of the packet times within a burst
from Figure 4.3. For example, we take the time sequence of the first burst:
[0.0, 0.20], and take the interval of these two values.
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The other five features consider two consecutive bursts B1 and B2.
Interval between the medians of B1 and B2 (IMD):
Figure 4.4: Interval between the medians of B1 and B2 (IMD).
We can see the extraction process of the interval between the medians of B1
and B2 (IMD) from Figure 4.4. For example, we take the median of the burst
one and the burst two: [0.10, 0.50], and take the interval of these two values.
Interval between the Start of B1 and the Start of B2:
Figure 4.5: Interval between the start of B1 and the start of B2.
We can see the extraction process of the interval between the start of B1 and
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the start of B2 from Figure 4.5. For example, we take the time of the first
packet of the burst one and the time of the first packet of burst two: [0.00,
0.40], and take the interval of these two values.
Interval between the End of B1 and the Start of B2 (IBD):
Figure 4.6: Interval between the end of B1 and the start of B2 (IBD).
We can see the extraction process of the interval between the end of B1 and
the start of B2 (IBD) from Figure 4.6. For example, we take the time of the
last packet of the burst one and the time of the second packet of burst two:
[0.20, 0.40], and take the interval of these two values.
Interval between the Start of B1 and the Start of B2, where both B1
and B2 are Incoming (to the client):
We can see the extraction process of the interval between the start of B1 and
the start of B2, where both B1 and B2 are incoming (to the client) from Figure
4.7. For example, we take the time of the first packet of the first incoming
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Figure 4.7: Interval between the start of B1 and the start of B2, where both
B1 and B2 are incoming (to the client).
burst and the time of the first packet of the second incoming burst: [0.40,
0.75], and take the interval of these two values.
Interval between the Start of B1 and the Start of B2, where both B1
and B2 are Outgoing (from the client):
Figure 4.8: Interval between the start of B1 and the start of B2, where both
B1 and B2 are outgoing (from the client).
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We can see the extraction process of the interval between the start of B1 and
the start of B2, where both B1 and B2 are outgoing (from the client) from
Figure 4.8. For example, we take the time of the first packet of the first
outgoing burst and the time of the first packet of the second outgoing burst:
[0.00, 0.65], and take the interval of these two values.
Figure 4.9: Processing Features.
To create features that would be robust to different instances, we further
process the extracted features (see Figure 4.9). Using the data from all the
instances over all websites, we create a histogram of b equal-sized bins for each
feature. Then, for each instance, we extract the features from raw data, put
them into their respective bins, and take the length of each bin. Finally, we
normalize the length of each bin and feed those normalized values into the
classifiers.
4.2.1.1 Tuning the Number of Bins
We tune the number of bins for each dataset. We started with b = 20. We
explore the variation in accuracy with the change of the bin sizes. We think
that number of features a bin can contain impact the classification accuracy.
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For example, if we increase the number of bins, every bin will contain less
features but are more fine-grained. On the other hand, if we decrease the
number of bins, every bin will contain more features but are less fine-grained.
So we have to make a trade-off between the number of bins and the number of
features a bin contain. Taking that into account, we explore different number
of bins to find the best one based on the accuracy. We present our search
space of bin size in Table 4.2. We could not go beyond b = 25 for Walkie-
Talkie defense because the highest number of packets of that dataset is less
than 200. Hence, the more we increase bin size, the lesser information the bin
contain. We finally select b = 20 for undefended and WTF-PAD defense and
b = 10 for Walkie-Talkie defense.
Table 4.2: Tuning Number of Bins.
Dataset Number of Bins Search Final Bin Size
Undefended 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50 20
WTF-PAD 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50 20
Walkie-Talkie 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 10
4.2.2 Hyperparameter Tuning in CNN
Different types of datasets require different hyper-parameters in the CNN
model to make the model robust. Usually deep learning models require a
lot of data for training. We have sufficient data to use a deep CNN model in
the undefended and WTF-PAD datasets. However, for the Walkie-Talkie de-
28
fense we have a relatively small dataset. This means we need to use a shallow
CNN model to avoid overfitting. We provide an overview of the parameters of
our models in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4.
Table 4.3: Hyperparameters Tuning of CNN Model for Undefended and WTF-
PAD Dataset.
Final Parameters
Hyperparameters Search Range Undefended WTF-PAD






Layer 1 [Conv1, Conv2]
Layer 2 [Conv3, Conv4]
Layer 3 [Conv5, Conv6]













Filter Sizes [3 ... 10] [8, 8, 8, 8 ] [8, 8, 8, 8 ]
Pooling Max Max Max
Learning Rate [0.001 ... 0.05] 0.001 0.001
Training Epochs [30 ... 500] 50 100




ELU, ReLU ReLU, Tanh
Number of FC Layers [1 ... 4] 2 2
Hidden units (each FCs) [128 ... 512] [512, 512] [512, 512]
Dropout [Pooling, FC1, FC2] [0.1 .. 0.8] [0.1, 0.7, 0.5] [0.1, 0.5, 0.5]
To further avoid overfitting, we add a kernel regularizer, dropout [22], and
batch-normalization in our models. For the kernel regularizer, we adopt l2
regularization, also called weight decay. Kernel regularization is usually im-
plemented in each convolutional layer. Dropout is implemented in the fully
connected (FC) layers. Dropout randomly disconnects some of the units in the
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Table 4.4: Hyperparameters Tuning of CNN Model for Walkie-Talkie Dataset.
Final Parameters
Hyperparameters Search Range Walkie-Talkie






Layer 1 [Conv1, Conv2]
Layer 2 [Conv3, Conv4]







Filter Sizes [3 ... 10] [8, 8, 5, 5 ]
Pooling Max Max
Learning Rate [0.001 ... 0.05] 0.001
Training Epochs [30 ... 500] 100





Number of FC Layers [1 ... 4] 1
Hidden units (each FCs) [128 ... 512] 512
Dropout [FC1] [0.1 .. 0.6] 0.5
FC layers and make the model more robust for testing. We add batch normal-
ization [11] in both the convolutional layer and the FC layer. We use dropout
in both of our CNN models. We use kernel regularizer in the CNN model for
the Walkie-Talkie dataset and batch normalization in the CNN model for the




In this chapter, we discuss the evaluation of our timing features and present
results based on the three research questions we investigated. First, we provide
a brief overview of our experimental environment in Section 5.1. Secondly, we
address our three research questions and the experimental results in Section
5.2. Then we discuss our results in Section 5.3.
5.1 Experimental Environment
We use a PC with a Core i7-6700 processor with 8 cores and 32GB RAM, plus
a NVIDIA Quadro K1200 GPU with 4GB GPU memory. For compiling deep
learning models to run on a GPU, we use Cuda Version 7.5. We develop our
model in Python using the Keras deep learning framework as the front end
and the Tensorflow deep learning framework as the back end.
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5.2 Results
5.2.1 RQ1: Packet Timing Features
RQ1: How can we represent packet timing information in a way that
robustly reveals patterns over different instances of a site?
To respond this question, we selected and extracted eight timing features in
a five steps process (see Figure 4.9). We extracted our timing features from
the burst-level characteristics. Among the eight features, three features are
based on the timing of a single burst. The other five features are based on the
two consecutive bursts B1 and B2. Refer to Section 4.2.1 for the details of our
timing features selection and extraction process.
5.2.2 RQ2: Classification Value of Timing Features
RQ2: How useful are those new representations for developing WF
attack?
We explored the use of all eight features, both separately and together, in
both k-NN, and SVM for different settings of the number of bins b in each
histogram. Based on our initial findings, we found that the most effective
combination was the three features MED, IMD, and IBD with b = 20 bins, so
we present results with these features.
In our initial phase experiments, we investigated and experimented our timing
features with K−NN and SVM classifiers. As shown in Table-5.1, MED, IMD,
and IBD all provide some classification value on their own, where random
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Table 5.1: Undefended Tor: Attack accuracy.
Features
Classifier MED IMD IBD Combined
k-NN 41% 20% 18% 51%
SVM 56% 24% 29% 61%
guessing would only reach 1% accuracy in this multi-class scenario. Together,
these three features can get 61% accuracy with SVM on undefended Tor traffic.
Based on the findings of the initial experiments, we extended our experiments
on timing features to the deep learning model. We adopted one of the most
powerful deep learning classifiers: Convolutional Neural Network (CNN).
Table 5.2: Undefended Tor: Attack accuracy in CNN.
Classifier Combined Features
CNN 88%































Figure 5.1: Undefended Tor Traffic: Attack Accuracy with CNN.
Using the CNN classifier, we attain 88% testing accuracy (see Table- 5.2) with
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undefended Tor traffic. We attain up to 98% of training accuracy and up to
92% of validation accuracy at the 50th epoch (see Figure-5.1). We performed
our experiments with different structures of CNN model to understand the
variation of our results. Finally, we selected the model that gave us the best
accuracy. Refer to Table 4.3 for an overview of the search space of our model.
While our results are not as good as the state-of-the-art classifiers, it is an
encouraging result given that we are not using any of the features about bursts
cited in prior work as being important for effective classification.
5.2.3 RQ3: WF Attack with Timing Features
RQ3: Do the new representations also provide classification value when
WF defenses are in place?
5.2.3.1 WF Attack with Defended Tor Traffic




We experimented with the combined feature set against the two defended
datasets, using WTF-PAD and Walkie-Talkie (W-T), as reported in Table-
5.3.
Against WTF-PAD, we attain 54% accuracy using SVM and 76% accuracy
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(a) Model Accuracy (b) Model Loss
Figure 5.2: Defended Tor Traffic with WTF-PAD Defense: Attack Accuracy
with CNN.
using CNN. Our CNN model gave us up to 96% of training accuracy and 78%
of validation accuracy (see Figure- 5.2).































Figure 5.3: Defended Tor Traffic with W-T Defense: Attack Accuracy with
CNN.
Against W-T, we get 43% accuracy using SVM and 47% accuracy using CNN.
Note that 47% is higher than any accuracy results reported on W-T to date
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and approaching the 50% theoretical maximum accuracy claimed for W-T [25].
That maximum accuracy depends on not using timing data, so our approach
might exceed 50% accuracy when both timing and burst data are considered.
5.3 Discussion
Our findings show that packet timing information can be an important candi-
date for feature for the WF attack. Using timing features provides reasonable
attack accuracy against the state-of-the-art defenses as well. However, pro-
cessing the timing features is a cumbersome task. First, it involves multiple
steps to extract the fine-grained timing features. Secondly, tuning the number
of bins is also challenging because it requires a trail and error process. No
one specific number of bins can work for every dataset. The whole process re-
quires multiple iterations from the start to the end. Another challenging task
is hyperparameter tuning to find the best CNN model for our datasets. Fi-
nally, we have two datasets that are large enough for our deep learning models,
but Walkie-Talkie (W-T) dataset is not large enough. A larger W-T dataset
could give us better understanding of the accuracy using our timing features.
However, we still get higher accuracy than the accuracies for the other attacks
shown in the W-T paper [25] using only timing features.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion & Future Work
In this thesis, we propose a novel WF attack based on extracting features from
packet timing information. The main purpose of our research is to find useful
timing features that can be used in WF attacks. We selected and extracted
eight new timing features from packet timestamps in a five-step process. We
show the effectiveness of our features in both traditional ML and deep learning
models. We find that our features are robust over multiple noisy instances and
provide useful classification value against both undefended and defended Tor
traffic. Using timing features in our CNN model, we achieve 88% accuracy.
We achieve 47% accuracy against W-T defense as well. In future work, we will
investigate more to improve this attack and improve our model as well. We
will investigate the performance of timing and direction features together. We
plan to collect a larger W-T dataset to evaluate further the effectiveness of
our timing features. We will also expand our evaluation to Onion Services and
the open-world setting. In the future, our goal is to build a defense against
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